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Abstract
Empirical trade economists have found that shocks on foreign direct
investment (FDI) of some parent country in a host country affect the
same parent country’s FDI in other hosts (interdependent hosts). In-
dependent of this, there is evidence that shocks on a parent country’s
FDI in some host economy affect other parent countries’ FDI in the
same host (interdependent parents). In general equilibrium, shocks on
FDI between any country pair will affect all country-pairs’ FDI in the
world, including anyone of the two countries in a pair as well as third
countries (interdependent third countries). No attempt has been made
so far to allow simultaneously for all three modes of interdependence
of FDI. Using cross-sectional data on FDI among 22 OECD coun-
tries in 2000, we employ a spatial feasible generalized two-stage least
squares and generalized moments estimation framework to allow for all
three modes of interdependence across all parent and host countries,
thereby distinguishing between market-size-related and remainder in-
terdependence. Our results highlight the complexity of multinational
enterprises’ investment strategies and the interconnectedness of the
world investment system.
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“Although [previous] work has focused on outward investment and the
choice among host locations, it is just as important to recognize that third
country effects may be important for inbound FDI as well.”
(Blonigen et al., 2008, p.183)
1 Introduction
Two arguments have been put forward in the literature about the interde-
pendence or ‘spaceyness’ of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI). First,
shocks on a given parent country’s outward FDI in some host country affect
the same parent country’s FDI in other host countries. Second, shocks on
a given host country’s inward FDI from some parent country affect inward
FDI from other parent countries in the same host country.
The first line of reasoning roots in theoretical work on export platform
FDI and vertically organized networks of multinational enterprises (MNEs),
where the location and output decisions of MNEs are interdependent across
host markets and partly depend on the openness to trade in final goods
(Yeaple, 2003; Baltagi et al., 2007; Ekholm et al., 2007) or intermediate
goods (Grossman et al., 2007; Bergstrand and Egger, 2008) across potential
host countries. Hence, this literature motivates a Spacey-Hosts hypothesis
for empirical work: a smaller distance between host countries should lead to
stronger interdependence of a given parent country’s (outward) FDI across
hosts, since, e.g., it facilitates exports of foreign affiliates to other host coun-
tries as well as intermediate goods trade among affiliates there.
As to the second line of reasoning, there is a smaller body of work that
suggests that the location and output decisions of MNEs from different par-
ent countries in a given host economy are interdependent too. Blonigen et al.
(2008) illustrate that the interrelationship of bilateral FDI across parents is
related to trade costs among the parent countries. Hence, this literature mo-
tivates a Spacey-Parents hypothesis for empirical work: a smaller distance
between parent countries should lead to stronger interdependence of a given
host country’s (inward) FDI across parents, since, e.g., learning about the
host market happens more likely between headquarters in similar, neighbor-
ing parent countries.
Taking this argument one step further, an implication of multi-country
general equilibrium models is that bilateral FDI decisions are not only in-
terdependent across parents for a given host and across hosts for a given
parent, but that FDI for a given parent-host country pair will also affect
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and depend on (determinants of and shocks on) FDI between other, third
parent and host countries. This third mode of interdependence, which has
been entirely ignored in empirical work so far, motivates what we refer to as
Spacey-Third-Countries hypothesis.
Indeed, empirical evidence is supportive to the Spacey-Hosts hypothesis
(Baltagi et al., 2007; Blonigen et al., 2007) and the Spacey-Parents hypothesis
in bilateral FDI (Blonigen et al., 2008). However, so far these two hypotheses
have only been assessed in isolation from each other. Moreover, no attempt
has been made to find empirical evidence on the Spacey-Third-Countries
hypothesis.
This has several fundamental consequences. First, allowing for only one
mode of interdependence at a time and omitting the others may lead to
biased estimates and a misattribution of the effects of omitted modes of in-
terdependence to the one considered in the empirical model. Second, it pre-
cludes a quantification of the relative importance of the Spacey-Parents, the
Spacey-Hosts, and the Spacey-Third-Countries hypotheses. Finally, ignoring
relevant modes of interdependence in the model specification will result in
heteroskedastic error terms, e.g., rendering maximum likelihood estimates of
spatial econometric models inconsistent (Lee, 2004) and invalidating stan-
dard inference.
Using cross-sectional data on bilateral stocks of outward FDI from 22
parent and host countries (i.e., 462 parent-host pairs) in the year 2000, this
paper specifies and estimates an integrated spatial econometric cross-section
model to assess the three aforementioned modes of interdependence simulta-
neously. It distinguishes explicitly between market-size-related and remain-
der interdependence in FDI across parents and hosts. For estimation, we
use a heteroskedasticity-robust spatial generalized two-stage least squares
approach, building on Kelejian and Prucha (2010) and the extension of that
estimator to higher order spatial models by Badinger and Egger (2011), which
permits considering simultaneously alternative modes of interdependence.
Our results support the following conclusions. First, spaceyness matters
both in terms of market-size-related and remainder interdependence. For
instance, larger and close-by parent countries investing in a particular host
country increase the magnitude of a given parent country’s FDI there rel-
ative to the FDI of smaller and more distant parent countries. Moreover,
larger host countries in the neighborhood of a particular host increase a
given parent country’s FDI there relative to its FDI in smaller and more
distant host countries. The latter result is consistent with and may be inter-
preted as indirect evidence for export-platform FDI or information spillovers
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through correlated learning about host markets (Egger et al., 2011). We
also find evidence in support of the Spacey-Parents and the Spacey-Hosts
hypotheses with regard to remainder (unobservable) determinants of FDI.
To a somewhat lesser extent, we find support of the Spacey-Third-Countries
hypothesis. These findings suggest a relative dominance of interdependence
through learning and horizontal motives (e.g., through export platforms) as
well as vertical integration motives (e.g., through intermediate goods trade at
arm’s length or among affiliates) over the interdependence flowing from gen-
eral equilibrium effects (through resource constraints and multilateral factor
as well as output price effects).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the
specification of alternative modes of interdependence in FDI that will be used
in the empirical analysis. Section 3 sets up the empirical model, distinguishes
between market-size-related and remainder interdependence, and discusses
the econometric issues involved. Section 4 presents the estimation results.
The final section 5 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
2 Modes of Interdependence in FDI
To provide a formal specification of the three aforementioned modes or chan-
nels of interdependence, denote (the log of the stock of outward) FDI from
parent country i in host country j by yij. With I parent countries and J host
countries, a typical cross-sectional data-set of bilateral FDI then consists of
N = I × (J − 1) observations, which can be collected in the N × 1 vector
y ≡ {yij}. The structure of interdependence between FDI of two parent-host
country pairs is reflected in the N ×N matrix S ≡ {sij,i′j′}, whose elements
depict the interdependence between FDI from parent i to host j and FDI
from parent i′ to host j′.
According to theoretical models of multinational enterprises (MNEs), in-
terdependence will typically be stronger among large, well integrated coun-
tries, such that the elements sij,i′j′ , which will be specified more precisely
below, are expected to increase in the size of the parent and host country
and to decrease in their distance from each other.
2.1 Spacey Hosts
The Spacey-Hosts hypothesis put forward by Blonigen et al. (2007) states
that FDI from parent country i in host country j does not only depend on FDI
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in (characteristics of) host country j but also on FDI in (characteristics of)
other host countries j′. In terms of the interdependence matrix S this implies
that {sij,i′j′} 6= 0 for i = i′, j 6= j′, whereas {sij,i′j′} = 0 for i 6= i′ or j = j′.
We collect these Spacey-Hosts relationships in the matrix SH ≡ {sHij,i′j′}.
If MNEs are mainly of the horizontal type and set up foreign affiliates only
to serve the host country market, one might expect that larger neighboring
markets of a given host country reduce MNE activity in that economy. The
reason are resource constraints, whereby the same investment could ceteris
paribus serve a larger neighboring market and generate higher profits there
than in the host country at stake. Alternatively, one might expect export-
platform MNE activity to increase in a given host country if neighboring
countries are larger. The reason is that export-platform MNEs set up foreign
subsidiaries not only to serve the host market but also other surrounding
markets. Which of these two effects dominates is an empirical question.
As an example, consider potential investors in the United States (or an-
other parent country) regarding their decision to invest in, say, the United
Kingdom or Ireland. The United Kingdom is an attractive market to invest
in, since it is large, but investments there come at a high cost. Ireland is rel-
atively small, but investing there is cheaper. Moreover, Ireland is relatively
close to the United Kingdom (and other countries in the European Union) so
that the latter may be served by exports from subsidiaries in Ireland, making
the size of the host country itself less relevant.
As outlined above, according to theoretical models, interdependence is
expected to be larger for larger countries that are located close-by to each
other. Specifically, we ceteris paribus expect large host countries j′ in the
neighborhood of host country j to exert a larger influence on bilateral FDI
of parent country i than others. Country size and geographical distance
together determine economic distance (this argument is in line with a large
literature on gravity models of international trade). Hence, as a measure
of (inverse) ‘economic distance’ between two host countries j and j′, we
specify sHij,i′j′ = exp(lnGDPj + lnGDPj′ − lnDISTjj′) along the lines of
gravity models of bilateral trade (which assume unitary coefficients on the
log of exporter and importer countries’ GDPs and typically find a unitary
coefficient on the log of bilateral distance).
2.2 Spacey Parents
The Spacey-Parents hypothesis put forward by Blonigen et al. (2008) states
that FDI from parent country i in host country j does not only depend on
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FDI in (characteristics of) parent country i but also on FDI from (charac-
tersistics of) other parent countries i′ in host country j. In terms of the
interdependence matrix S this implies that {sij,i′j′} 6= 0 for i 6= i′, j = j′,
whereas {sij,i′j′} = 0 for j 6= j′ or i = i′. We collect these Spacey-Parents
relationships in the matrix SP ≡ {sPij,i′j′}.
As discussed in Blonigen et al. (2008), there are three main channels
through which spaceyness across parents should matter. First, FDI in a
particular host country requires the use of resources there. Accordingly,
an increase in FDI from other parent countries in a particular host leaves
fewer resources available to the parent of interest. Alternatively, an increase
in other parent countries’ FDI in that host could lower marginal costs and
create positive externalities (e.g., information spillovers) to a given parent
country’s outward FDI there (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998). Moreover, the
presence of many foreign firms may signal high institutional quality and an
attractive environment for foreign firms (Baird, 2010; Fahn et al., 2009).
Finally, interactions among parents could also occur due to competition in
output markets. Again, the direction of the bottom line effect remains to be
determined empirically.
To build on our earlier example, consider now investments by Japan in
Ireland. Japan’s decision about investing there will certainly be influenced
by the massive presence of firms from the United States (and other parent
countries). On the one hand, a thick market provides for a lot of information
about investing there. On the other hand, the information advantage may
be mitigated at least partly by higher investment costs (through, e.g., real
estate prices as well as a higher competitive pressure in the market).
As an example, consider potential investors in the United States (or an-
other parent country) regarding their decision to invest in, say, Germany or
Austria. The United Kingdom is an attractive market to invest in, since it is
large, but investments there come at a high cost. Ireland is relatively small,
but investing there is cheaper. Moreover, Ireland is relatively close to the
United Kingdom (and other countries in the European Union) so that the
latter may be served by exports from subsidiaries in Ireland, making the size
of the host country itself less relevant.
Following the same logic as with host countries, we expect large parent
countries i′ in the neighborhood of parent country i to exert a larger influence
on the FDI decisions of parent country i. Akin to host country economic
neighborhood, we measure (inverse) economic distance between two parent
countries i and i′ as sPij,i′j′ = exp(lnGDPi + lnGDPi′ − lnDISTii′).
6
2.3 Spacey Third Countries
In multi-country general equilibrium models of FDI (see, e.g., Yeaple, 2003;
Egger et al., 2007), complex effects from third countries other than a spe-
cific parent and host will arise, resulting in the dependence of (determinants
of) FDI for a given parent-host country pair on other, third parent and
host countries. In terms of the interdependence matrix S this implies that
{sij,i′j′} 6= 0 for i 6= i′, j 6= j′, whereas {sij,i′j′} = 0 for i = i′ or j = j′.
To conclude our example from above, consider a positive shock to the
German market. Clearly, such a shock will not only affect direct investments
by Germany abroad or direct investments in Germany. Since parent as well
as host countries are bound by resource constraints, investments of, say the
United States or Japan in Ireland or the United Kingdom will depend in-
directly on the shock to the German economy. The shock will change the
relative costs of investing in Germany versus other countries and it may even
effect the absolute costs of investing anywhere, if, at a given capital endow-
ment, investing becomes more attractive as a whole. Both of the latter will
ceteris paribus lead to a redirection of investments from anywhere to, say Ire-
land or the United Kingdom, and they may even change the absolute activity
of foreign investment, say, by the United States relative to Japan.
We collect these Spacey-Third-Countries relationships in the matrix ST ≡
{sTij,i′j′}, whose elements are again defined in terms of economic distance be-
tween two third countries i and j, i.e., sTij,i′j′ = exp(lnGDPi + lnGDPj −
lnDISTij). The sign of the effect of this mode of interdependence on bilateral
FDI will depend on the fundamental sources of interdependence, e.g., compe-
tition for globally mobile or tradable resources in third countries might deter
bilateral FDI elsewhere while third-country information spillovers might raise
it.
2.4 Summary
Summing up, we have defined three N ×N (weights) matrices reflecting one
mode of interdependence each, corresponding to the Spacey-Parents hypothe-
sis (SP ), the Spacey-Hosts hypothesis (SH), and the Spacey-Third-Countries
hypothesis (ST ):
SP ≡ {sPij,i′j′} ≡
{
0 for j 6= j′ or i = i′,
exp(lnRGDPi + lnRGDPi′ − lnDISTii′) otherwise,
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SH ≡ {sHij,i′j′} ≡
{
0 for i 6= i′ or j = j′,
exp(lnRGDPj + lnRGDPj′ − lnDISTjj′) otherwise,
(1)
ST ≡ {sTij,i′j′} ≡
{
0 for i = i′ or j = j′,
exp(lnRGDPi + lnRGDPj − lnDISTij) otherwise.
In order to rule out self-influence, i.e., a direct feedback of FDI of a given
parent-host pair on itself, the main diagonal elements of the weights matrices
are assumed to be zero throughout the paper, i.e., sPij,i′j′ = s
H
ij,i′j′ = s
T
ij,i′j′ = 0
for i = i′, j = j′. Moreover, as it is standard in the spatial econometrics liter-
ature, each weights matrix is row-normalized to ensure well-behaved asymp-
totic properties. Hence, the rows of each matrix sum to one such that the
elements of the normalized matrices reflect the structure of interdependence
in terms of relative economic distance.
Previous empirical studies considering the interdependence in FDI have
either ruled out interdependence among parents for a given host, assuming
that SP = 0 (Baltagi et al., 2007; Blonigen et al., 2007), or ruled out interde-
pendence among hosts for a given parent, assuming that SH = 0 (Blonigen
et al., 2008). Moreover, no study so far has considered third country inter-
dependence allowing for ST 6= 0.
3 Empirical Model
In order to integrate these arguments into an econometric analysis, we set up
a baseline empirical model that will be extended to allow for the three afore-
mentioned modes of interdependence. A number of determinants have been
proposed and found to influence bilateral activity of MNEs (see Markusen,
2002; Navaretti and Venables, 2004; Blonigen et al., 2003, for instance). Em-
pirical studies point to a relative dominance of the importance of market size
(parent and host country GDP) along with (differences) in parent and host
income per capita and geographical distance.
Hence, our starting point is the following parsimonious specification in-
cluding the key economic and geographical variables:
yij = β0 + β1 lnGDPi + β2 lnGDPj + β3 lnGDPPCi (2)
+β4 lnGDPPCj + β5 lnDISTij + β6CBij + qijδ + uij.
8
The dependent variable yij is the (natural log of the) stock of nominal out-
ward FDI from parent i to host j.1 The cross-sectional sample refers to the
year 2000 and comprises i = 1, . . . , I = 22 parent and j = 1, . . . , J = 21
host countries, making a total of N = 462 observations. The right-hand-side
variables include GDP and GDP per capita (GDPPC) of the parent and
host country, geographical distance between the parent and the host country
(DISTij) and a common border indicator variable (CBij).
Data on bilateral FDI stocks are taken from the United Nations Con-
ference on Aid and Development (UNCTAD) and from the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), GDP is from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and the geographical variables
are from the geographical database of the Centre d’E´tudes Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales. A more detailed description of the data and
summary statistics are provided in the Appendix of the paper.
The vector q includes a set of control variables that will be added in the
robustness analysis. There, we include indices related to parent and host
countries’ institutional quality taken from the International Country Risk
Guide database: rule of law (LAW ), government stability (GOVSTAB), in-
ternational investor profile (INVPROF ), bureaucracy (BUREAU ), corrup-
tion (CORRUPT ), international confidence (INTCONF ), as well as socioe-
conomic conditions (SOCOEC ). For an interpretation, note that all indices
are increasing in institutional quality. Alternatively, in the most comprehen-
sive empirical model, the vector q will be specified to include parent and host
country fixed effects. Finally, uij is a stochastic error term, whose properties
will be discussed below.
Most of previous empirical work on bilateral FDI (or other forms of MNE
activity) used models similar to Equation (2), where FDI from country i to
j is modeled as a function of characteristics of countries i and j along with
ij-specific bilateral variables only (e.g., Brainard, 1997; Carr et al., 2001;
Blonigen et al., 2003; Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Egger and Pfaffermayr,
2005). Hence, interdependence across country pairs has been ruled out by
assumption.
Only recently, empirical work illustrated that this assumption seems con-
tradicted not only by theoretical models with more than two countries (e.g.,
Yeaple, 2003; Ekholm et al., 2007) but also by data (Coughlin and Segev,
1We also employed a specification with real FDI stocks as dependent variable, calculated
using the host country’s GDP deflator, along with real parent and host country GDP on
the right-hand-side of Equation (2) and obtained very similar results.
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2000; Baltagi et al., 2007; Blonigen et al., 2007, 2008).
3.1 Specifying Spaceyness in FDI
We next we integrate the three aforementioned modes of interdependence into
Equation (2). Economic theory suggests that bilateral FDI is determined
by parent and host as well as third country market size. The extent to
which third (parent or host or other) country market size matters depends
on economic distance between a country pair and third countries. Hence, we
will first introduce market-size-related interdependence into Equation (2),
and then go on to specify and test for remainder interdependence, which will
be modeled through the disturbance process uij.
3.1.1 Market-Size-Related Spaceyness in FDI
Measuring (economic) country size in terms of GDP, the market-size-related
Spacey-Parents hypothesis is incorporated into Equation (2) by including an
(economic) distance weighted average of all parent countries’ GDP, which we
collect in the N × 1 vector s¯P . For observation ij, we have
s¯Pij =
I∑
i′=1
J∑
j′=1
sPij,i′j′ lnGDPi′ .
Accordingly, the market-size-related Spacey-Hosts hypothesis is associated
with the explanatory variable s¯H , given by
s¯Hij =
I∑
i′=1
J∑
j′=1
sHij,i′j′ lnGDPj′
and the market-size-related Spacey-Third-Countries hypothesis is associated
with explanatory variable s¯T , given by
s¯Tij =
I∑
i′=1
J∑
j′=1
sTij,i′j′ lnGDP
T
i′j′ ,
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where GDP Tij is GDP of the rest of the world (ROW), i.e., GDP
T
i′j′ ≡
GDPW −GDPi −GDPj.2
Collecting the explanatory and control variables in Equation (2) in the
matrices X and Q, and using the (N × 1) vectors sP ≡ {lnGDPi}, sH ≡
{lnGDPj}, and sT ≡ {lnGDP Ti′j′} to denote (the log of) parent GDP, host
GDP, and ROW GDP, respectively, Equation (2), augmented by the three
modes of market-size-related interdependence can be written succinctly in
matrix notation as
y = Xβ +Qδ + γP s¯
P + γH s¯
H + γT s¯
T + u, (3)
where the spatial lags of the GDP variables are defined as s¯P ≡ SPsP ,
s¯H ≡ SHsH , and s¯T ≡ STsT . Since the weights matrices are row-normalized,
the spatial lags of GDP reflect the structure of market-size-related inter-
dependence in FDI, whereas the parameters γP , γH , and γT measure the
strength of interdependence and are thus informative about the relative im-
portance of the three alternative modes of interdependence.
3.1.2 Remainder Spaceyness in FDI
While market-size-related spillovers are an important and possibly the pre-
dominant source of interdependence, we do not a priori expect them to cap-
ture spaceyness in FDI completely. First, in a sample of highly integrated
countries, the size of the domestic market is only an imperfect measure of
the market relevant for firms located in a particular host or parent country.
Moreover, externalities, specific factors, and economic success are not nec-
essarily tied to the size of an economy alone but could relate to preferences
and cultural aspects that are hard to measure. Hence, we summarize these
channels of interdependence unrelated to market size as remainder interde-
pendence.
Since interdependence in FDI materializing through these remainder chan-
nels is not included as an explanatory variable in Equation (3), it will be
captured by the error term uij and can thus be modeled and estimated by
using a spatial regressive disturbance process, which is given by
u = ρPSP + ρHSH + ρTST + ε, (4)
2World GDP is from the World Bank’s World Economic Outlook Database. As an alter-
native, we used the sum of the 22 countries in our sample and obtained virtually identical
results.
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where ε ≡ {εij} is an idiosyncratic error term, which is assumed to be inde-
pendently though not necessarily identically distributed, i.e., εij ∼ i.d. (0, σ2ij).
Notice that the specification in Equation (4) implies that a unit shock to
the error term ε, denoted as e, has a magnified impact on FDI through
spillover effects and the associated repercussions, given by (I − ρPSP −
ρHSH−ρTST )−1e. In our case with row normalized weights matrices the mul-
tiplier effect is equal across observations and amounts to 1/(1−ρP−ρH−ρT ).
In contrast to the specification of market-size-related interdependence in
Equation (3), the spatial regressive structure in (4) does not allow a linearly
additive decomposition of the effects of the three alternative modes of inter-
dependence, since the multiplier implied by (I−ρPSP−ρHSH−ρTST )−1 is a
nonlinear function of its arguments SP , SH , ST , ρP , ρH , and ρT .
3 However,
Equation (4) still allows to test for the significance of each single mode of
interdependence, the direction of their effects, and the respective coefficients
are indicative of their relative magnitude.
3.2 Econometric Issues
In the estimation of market-size-related interdependence in the main Equa-
tion (3) and the estimation of remainder interdependence in Equation (4)
there are several issues that deserve discussion.
3.2.1 LS and 2SLS Estimation of Market-Size-Related Interde-
pendence
Regarding Equation (3), while it is unlikely that there is relevant reverse
causality from bilateral FDI on aggregate GDP, we will – in light of the parsi-
monious specification – nevertheless use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) ap-
proach, instrumenting spatially weighted parent GDP (s¯P ), spatially weighted
host GDP (s¯H), and spatially weighted ROW GDP (s¯T ) by spatial weights of
(the log of) population, which is an arguably exogenous measure of country
size.
Moreover, to address potential endogeneity concerns related to the in-
terdependence matrices S, their elements defined in Equation (1) are con-
structed using GDP in 1995, whereas the variables in our cross-sectional
model (3) refer to the year 2000. However, for conservativeness, we also
3To see this consider the Leontief expansion (I − ρPSP − ρHSH − ρTST )−1 = (I +∑∞
m=1(ρPSP + ρHSH + ρTST )
m).
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pursue an alternative approach and construct weights matrices P ≡ {pij,i′j′}
that are based on a purely population and geography related gravity model
in the spirit of Frankel and Romer (1999). In line with Equation (1), its
elements are defined as pij,i′j′ = exp(lnPOPi + lnPOPj − lnDISTij).
Summing up, the instruments that will be used for s¯P , s¯H , and s¯T in
the estimation of Equation (3) are given by p¯P ≡ PPpP , p¯H ≡ PHpH , and
p¯T ≡ PTpT , where pP , pH , and pT are N × 1 vectors of (the log of) parent,
host, and ROW population respectively.
3.2.2 Generalized Moments (GM) Estimation of Remainder In-
terdependence
Having obtained consistent estimates of the parameters in Equation (3), the
residuals uˆ can be used for estimation of Equation (4) in a second step. Our
estimation procedure builds on the GM estimator introduced in the seminal
paper by Kelejian and Prucha (1999) and their extension to the case of
heteroskedastic error terms in Kelejian and Prucha (2010).
While the procedure in Kelejian and Prucha (2010) is designed for first
order processes with one channel of interdependence in the disturbances (or
spatial autocorrelation), Equation (4) involves a third-order process with
three parameters to be estimated. For this, we employ the generalization
of the GM estimator by Kelejian and Prucha (2010) to higher order spatial
regressive models by Badinger and Egger (2011). This approach is based on
the following moment conditions related to Equation (4):
N−1
[
E(ε′S′mSm′ε)− Tr
{
Sm′
[
diagNn=1 E(ε
2
n)
]
S′m
}]
= 0,
N−1 E(ε′Smε) = 0,
where m′ = {P,H, T} for m = {P}, m′ = {H,T} for m = {H}, and
m′ = {T} for m = {T}, i.e., there is a total of 6 moment conditions. (Tr
indicates the trace operator.)
Again, to avoid endogeneity concerns with respect to the weights matri-
ces S, we will use both the preferred measure of economic distance defined
in Equation (1), as well as population-based weights matrices P in the esti-
mation of the disturbance process (4).
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3.2.3 Spatial Feasible Generalized Two-Stage Least Squares Esti-
mation
Having estimated the disturbance process (4), the main Equation (3) can be
estimated more efficiently by using a spatial feasible generalized two-stage
least squares (FG2SLS) transformed version thereof, which is given by
Tˆ y = TˆXβ + TˆQδ + γP Tˆ s¯
P + γHTˆ s¯
H + γT Tˆ s¯
T + Tˆ u, (5)
where Tˆ = (I− ρˆPSP− ρˆHSH− ρˆTST ) is the estimated spatial GLS transfor-
mation matrix, the scalars ρˆP , ρˆH , and ρˆT denote the estimates of the spatial
regressive parameters from Equation (4), Tˆ uˆ = εˆ, is a consistent estimate
of ε, and the transformed instruments are given by Tˆ p¯P , Tˆ p¯H , and Tˆ p¯T .
Badinger and Egger (2011) also provide results for a (consistent estimate of
the) variance-covariance matrix of the spatial FG2SLS and the GM parame-
ter estimates, which is robust against heteroskedasticity of arbitrary form in
the error term ε.
4 Estimation Results
In the following, we report the least squares (LS) and two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimates of Equation (3). We then turn to the results of the gener-
alized moments (GM) estimates of the spatial regressive disturbance process
(4) and the feasible generalized two-stage least squares (FG2SLS) estimates
of Equation (3).
4.1 LS and 2SLS Estimates of Market-Size-Related In-
terdependence
The first column in Table 1 presents the LS estimates of our basic specifica-
tion in Equation (3) without controls. Results are as expected and in line
with previous studies: FDI is larger between larger parent and host countries
that are located close-by to each other and share a common border.
Parent country GDP per capita also enters positively, whereas host coun-
try GDP per capita shows a negative sign, though it is not statistically
significant. This suggests that differences in per capita income (which also
approximate differences in capital-labor ratios and skill differences) have a
positive effect on bilateral FDI, which is consistent with vertical motives of
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FDI and a separation of headquarters services in the parent country and
production in host countries. In spite of the fact that host country GDP per
capita is insignificant in most specifications, we proceed with an unrestricted
version of Equation (3) to avoid biased estimates by imposing a wrong re-
striction and include parent and host GDP per capita (separately) in the
subsequent analysis.
Column (2) acknowledges the Spacey-Parents and the Spacey-Hosts hy-
potheses by adding s¯P and s¯H to the basic specification. Both variables
turn out to be statistically significant (at 1 an 5 percent, respectively) and
are roughly equal in magnitude in statistical terms judged by their standard
errors. Hence, there is no evidence for a predominant role of either mode
of market-size-related interdependence – a finding that will be endorsed by
other specifications below.
Moreover, notice that both coefficients γˆP and γˆH exhibit a positive sign.
This suggests a dominance of positive market-size-related spillovers from in-
creases in GDP of other host countries, which can be interpreted as evidence
for the relevance of export-platform FDI. Moreover, it suggests a dominance
of positive market-size-related spillovers from increases in GDP of other par-
ent countries, which can be interpreted as evidence for existence of positive
(possibly information-related) externalities among parents for a given host.
Quantitatively, the results indicate that an increase in other parent and host
countries’ GDP by 1 percent increases FDI of a given parent-host country
pair by 0.168 percent through the Spacey-Hosts channel and by 0.297 percent
through positive spillovers from the Spacey-Parents channel.
Column (3) acknowledges the Third-Country-Spacey-Parents-and-Spacey-
Hosts hypothesis by including the variable s¯T . The coefficient turns out
negative as expected from a theoretical perspective though it is not significant
at conventional levels. Hence, at least as market-size-related spillovers are
concerned, there is no strong evidence for third-country effects beyond parent
and host country spaceyness.
– Table 1 –
Column (4) presents the 2SLS estimates of the specification given in Col-
umn (2), where weighted parents’ GDP (s¯P ) and weighted hosts’ GDP (s¯H)
are instrumented by weighted parents’ population (p¯P ) and weighted hosts’
population (p¯H), using weights matrices P that are constructed based on
a purely geographical gravity model (see Section 3.2). Notice first that a
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of exogenous regressors at the 10
15
percent level (with a p-value of 0.064); this result is confirmed by further
specifications considered, such that we report only the 2SLS estimates in
what follows.
Second, the 2SLS estimates are similar to the LS estimates. In particu-
lar, the spatial lags s¯P and s¯P turn out significant at 1 percent. Moreover
their coefficients are larger than in the LS regression and virtually identi-
cal with values of 0.310 and 0.314, respectively. This confirms the positive
effects and quantitatively equal role of market-size-related parent and host
interdependence obtained in the LS estimates in Column (2).4
To ensure that our results are not driven by outliers, Column (5) reports
the results of the specification in Column (4), where 5 outlying observations
with standardized residuals larger than 3 are neutralized.5 Results are iden-
tical in qualitative terms and very similar in quantitative terms, whereas the
standard error decreases and the explanatory power of the model in terms of
the R2 rises from 0.610 to 0.719. In the subsequent analysis we proceed with
this approach towards treating outliers, though we add that our results hold
up when disregarding them.
While the choice of a parsimonious specification is intentional, allowing
to capture spillover effects materializing through various channels, we check
the robustness of the results against including a set of indicators related
to the institutional quality of the parent and the host country (see Section
3.1) in Column (6). Overall, a marginal increase in the attractiveness (in
terms of institutional quality) of domestic investment in the parent country
tends to reduce bilateral FDI, whereas better institutional quality in the
hosts increases FDI. This finding may be interpreted as reflecting the trade-
off between domestic and foreign investment under constrained resources,
though it should be noted that most of the institutional indicators turn out
insignificant at conventional levels. Most importantly, however, the variables
s¯P and s¯H are robust against the inclusion of institutional controls and the
findings concerning the Spacey-Hosts and Spacey-Parents hypotheses remain
unchanged.
4Spatially weighted third countries’ GDP (s¯T ), instrumented by p¯T , turns out insignificant
as in the LS regression in Column (3).
5These are observations on the following parent-host country pairs: Czech Republic-
Portugal, Greece-Slovenia, Poland-Norway, Portugal-Slovak Republic, and Slovak
Republic-Portugal. We exclude the corresponding data points from the sample. Notice
that this is almost equivalent to neutralizing them by pair-specific indicator variables,
except that the latter procedure would rely on slightly differently normalized weights
matrices for remainder spillovers in the disturbances.
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This also holds true for the specification in Column (7), where parent and
host country fixed effects are included, along with the two bilateral variables
DISTij and CBij. In fact, in this most comprehensive specification, the
variables s¯P and s¯P assume their largest coefficients, suggesting that an
increase in other parent and host countries GDP by 1 percent increases FDI
of a given parent-host country pair by 0.461 percent through spillovers from
other hosts and by 0.478 percent through spillovers from other parents.
4.2 GM Estimates of Remainder Interdependence and
Spatial FG2SLS Estimates
In the following we test for remainder, i.e., other than market-size-related
interdependence in the error term u as specified in Equation (4) and present
the results along with the FG2SLS estimates of Equation (3).
Columns (1a)-(1c) in the lower panel of Table 2 report the estimates of
the preferred specification from Column (5) of Table 1, separately testing
for each of the three modes of remainder interdependence associated with
weights matrices SP , SH , and ST . The coefficients point to statistically
significant spillover effects resulting from Spacey-Parents and Spacey-Hosts
relationships, and to negative spillovers from Spacey-Third-Countries rela-
tionships, though the latter are insignificant with a p-value of 0.180. When
the GDP-based weights matrices S are replaced by the population-based
matrices P the estimates of ρP and ρH are almost unchanged, whereas the
estimate of ρT increases in magnitude to −1.900 and becomes significant at
the 5 percent level.
Column (1d) adds all three modes of interdependence simultaneously as
specified in the third-order spatial regressive model in Equation (4). Com-
pared with the results in Columns (1a)-(1c) the signs of the coefficients re-
main unchanged, though now all three spillover parameter estimates are sig-
nificant at 1 percent. The multiplier effect associated with a simultaneous,
unitary shock in the disturbances to all country-pairs implied by the esti-
mates in Column (1d) amounts to 3.172. Hence, such a shock is amplified
by a factor of more than three, alluding to the importance of spillovers.
Column (1e) reports the estimates, when the GDP-based weights matrices
S in Equation (4) are replaced by population based weights matrices P .
While there is no change in the qualitative conclusions relative to the previous
model, the multiplier effect turns out smaller, amounting to 1.468.
Columns (2a)-(2d) of Table 2 report the results from the same estimation
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approach for the specification in Column (6) of Table 1, which extends the
baseline equation by the institutional control variables. Remainder spillover
effects resulting from Spacey-Parents and Spacey-Hosts relationships still en-
ter significantly, whereas Spacey-Third-Country effects now turn out insignif-
icant with a t-statistic smaller than unity. When all three modes of inter-
dependence are included jointly they all turn out significant, though with
a multiplier effect smaller than one, amounting to 0.788. However, these
results should not be over-stressed in light of the relatively large standard
errors: in particular, the hypothesis that the multiplier effect in Column (2d)
amounts to 1.5 (as in the specification in Column (1d)) cannot be rejected
at the 10 percent level.
– Table 2 –
Finally, Columns (3a)-(3c) provide the corresponding results with parent and
host country fixed effects included in the main Equation (3). In that case
only remainder spacey-hosts effects remain significant in the estimation. It
should be noted, however, that the parent and host country fixed effects are
likely to capture not only demand side effects and institutional characteristics
but also remainder spillover effects to some extent, partialling them out of
the error term u. In that case, controlling for these fixed effects would imply
underestimating the role and magnitude of remainder interdependence when
considering the disturbances alone. On the other hand, omitting parent and
host country effects beyond observable variables might lead to an upward bias
of remainder interdependence effects. This reasoning suggests interpreting
the estimated remainder interdependence effects in Columns (1) and (3) as
upper and lower bounds, respectively.
Results of the spatial FG2SLS estimation of Equation (3) are reported
in the upper panel of Table 2. In fact, they turn out very similar to the
ones of the 2SLS estimates in Section 4.1. Both market-size related Spacey-
Hosts and market-size related Spacey-Parents effects enter significantly with
coefficients of equal magnitude of around 0.4, suggesting that an increase in
other parent and host countries’ GDP by 1 percent increases FDI of a given
parent-host country pair by some 0.8 percent through the export platform
motive and positive spillovers from other parents.6
Taken together these results confirm the importance of the market-size
related and remainder Spacey-Parents and Spacey-Hosts hypotheses and pro-
6Again, we do not find a significant and robust effect of market-size related Spacey-Third-
Countries effects.
18
vide some weaker evidence for the existence of remainder Spacey-Third-
Countries effects.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence on the relative importance of three modes of
interdependence (’spaceyness’) of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI):
(i) interdependence across parent countries’ outward FDI in a given host
country (Spacey-Parents), (ii) interdependence across host countries’ inward
FDI from a given parent country (Spacey-Hosts), and (iii) interdependence
among FDI for a given parent-host country pair across other, third coun-
tries (Spacey-Third-Countries). It explicitly distinguishes between interde-
pendence related to the market size of countries (market-size-related inter-
dependence) and other, not further specified remainder determinants.
The paper considers a cross section of bilateral FDI among 22 European
OECD countries referring to the year 2000, since FDI is expected to react to
spillovers and fundamentals suggested by economic theory in the long run.
A spatial econometric approach is employed to simultaneously test for the
relevance of all three aforementioned modes of interdependence. According to
our findings, both market-size related and remainder interdependence across
host countries are important.
The evidence supports an interdependence of investments through both
export-platform and vertical (intra-firm trade in intermediate goods) mo-
tives of FDI, consistent with the Spacey-Hosts hypothesis. Moreover, the
paper provides evidence of the simultaneous role of interdependence of par-
ent countries, consistent with the Spacey-Parents hypothesis. The latter may
root in information spillovers and learning across parent countries about a
given host country. Apparently, none of these modes of interdependence
should be excluded from an empirical model a priori. There is somewhat
weaker evidence on the role of remainder interdependence related to coun-
tries other than a given parent-host pair. The strongest and most robust
mode of both market-size-related and remainder interdependence appears to
be due to Spacey-Hosts relationships.
Overall, the results are supportive to multi-country theoretical models
emphasizing the complexity of MNEs’ integration strategies. They suggest
a co-existence of various modes of interdependence in the world economy’s
bilateral FDI relationships that should be considered more closely in future
theoretical work and be accounted for in empirical studies on MNE activity.
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Appendix
Our crosss-ectional sample refers to the year 2000 and consists of 22 European
OECD countries, which enter the data-set as both parents and hosts of FDI,
yielding a total of 462 observations. The countries are: Austria, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Re-
public, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom.
Data on aggregate stocks of outward FDI in nominal U.S. dollars at the
bilateral level are from the United Nations Conference on Aid and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD) and from the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). While the OECD provides data on inward as
well as outward FDI of OECD countries only, UNCTAD reports data for
a larger set of economies. Data on FDI tend to be incomplete from either
source. Our aim is to focus on the largest possible set of countries, for which
we can gather a complete cross-section of bilateral FDI stocks and hence a
balanced data set. Using data from both UNCTAD and OECD and interpo-
lating missing values of outward FDI stocks by using inward FDI stocks from
mirror statistics of the same sources, we obtain a cross-sectional dataset of
bilateral stocks of outward FDI for the aforementioned 22 European OECD
countries.7
Data on nominal and real GDP per capita (in 2000 USD) are taken from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. The geopraphi-
cal variables, i.e., distance between country’s capitals and the common bor-
der dummy, are from the the geographical database of the Centre d’E´tudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). Finally, the variables
related to the various institutional characteristics of the parent and host
countries are from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database.
Summary statistics of the key variables used in the empirical analysis are
provided in Table A1.
7Apart from obtaining a balanced dataset, the focus on European OECD countries has two
advantages. First, criteria of FDI data collection are more homogeneous than in a broader
set of economies. Second, motives of FDI should be more similar than in a larger set of
countries (with more pronounced differences in, e.g., factors costs and endowments).
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
mean median max min st. dev.
FDI a) 3902 274 272,990 0.01 15,684
GDP a) 439,364 184,000 2,140,000 20,600 570,147
GDPPC b) 17,866 21,837 36,390 2800 9820
DIST c) 1310 1242 3363 60 684
CB 0.1 0 1 0 0.6
LAW 5.4 6.0 6.0 4.0 0.7
GOVSTAB 10.1 10.1 11.0 9.1 0.6
INVPROF 9.2 9.0 11.0 6.0 1.3
BUREAU 3.6 4.0 4.0 2.0 0.6
CORRUPT 4.6 5.0 6.0 2.0 1.0
INTCONF 11.0 12.0 12.0 4.3 2.0
SOCEC 6.9 7.3 10.0 2.0 1.8
Notes: Descriptives based on 457 observations (excluding 5 outlying observations),
referring to the year 2000. a) nominal GDP and stocks of outward FDI in mill.
USD, b) real GDP per capita in USD (base year 2000), c) Distance in kilometers
between countries’ capitals.
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Table 1: LS and 2SLS Estimates of Equation (3)
Dependent variable is lnFDIij
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LS LS LS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
lnGDPi 1.180
∗∗∗ 1.419∗∗∗ 1.416∗∗∗ 1.613∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗∗ 1.551∗∗∗ .
(0.088) (0.177) (0.178) (0.172) (0.147) (0.145) .
lnGDPj 1.026
∗∗∗ 1.430∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗ 1.454∗∗∗ 1.232∗∗∗ 1.449∗∗∗ .
(0.122) (0.221) (0.221) (0.219) (0.144) (0.152) .
lnGDPPCi 1.973
∗∗∗ 1.870∗∗∗ 1.874∗∗∗ 1.819∗∗∗ 1.731∗∗∗ 1.846∗∗∗ .
(0.180) (0.184) (0.185) (0.179) (0.154) (0.299) .
lnGDPPCj -0.055 -0.183 -0.178 -0.209 -0.105 -0.934
∗∗∗ .
(0.154) (0.158) (0.157) (0.162) (0.130) (0.273) .
lnDISTij -1.180
∗∗∗ -1.586∗∗∗ -1.603∗∗∗ -1.723∗∗∗ -1.707∗∗∗ -1.353∗∗∗ -1.994∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.271) (0.276) (0.265) (0.215) (0.241) (0.339)
CBij 0.279 0.568
∗ 0.551∗ 0.666∗∗ 0.539∗ 0.949∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.307) (0.311) (0.323) (0.294) (0.312) (0.325)
s¯Pij . 0.297
∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
. (0.096) (0.096) (0.102) (0.084) (0.088) (0.166)
s¯Hij . 0.168
∗∗ 0.136 0.314∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗
. (0.085) (0.090) (0.102) (0.092) (0.091) (0.199)
s¯Tij . . -3.375 . . . .
. . (3.484) . . . .
LAWi . . . . . 0.507
∗∗ .
. . . . . (0.223) .
LAWj . . . . . 0.206 .
. . . . . (0.214) .
GOVSTABi . . . . . 0.271 .
. . . . . (0.180) .
GOVSTABj . . . . . 0.336
∗ .
. . . . . (0.176) .
INVPROFi . . . . . -0.150
∗∗ .
. . . . . (0.076) .
INVPROFj . . . . . 0.107 .
. . . . . (0.082) .
BUREAUi . . . . . -0.310 .
. . . . . (0.341) .
BUREAUj . . . . . 0.729
∗∗ .
. . . . . (0.332) .
CORRUPTi . . . . . 0.009 .
. . . . . (0.113) .
CORRUPTj . . . . . -0.068 .
. . . . . (0.118) .
INTCONFi . . . . . -0.153
∗∗∗ .
. . . . . (0.045) .
INTCONFj . . . . . 0.033 .
. . . . . (0.051) .
SOCOECi . . . . . -0.167
∗ .
. . . . . (0.090) .
SOCOECj . . . . . 0.178
∗∗ .
. . . . . (0.084) .
R2 0.601 0.612 0.612 0.610 0.719 0.753 0.800
σu 2.434 2.406 2.408 2.412 1.818 1.733 1.605
Observations 462 462 462 462 457 457 457
Notes: In 2SLS estimates (columns (4)-(7)), s¯Pij , s¯
H
ij , s¯
T
ij are instrumented by
p¯Pij , p¯
H
ij , p¯
T
ij (see Section 3.2). Columns (5)-(7) excludes 5 outliers, defined as
observations where the standardized residual in column (4) exceeds a value of 3.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in parentheses.
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